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The Flip-Flops of Oppressive Tolerance 
 
Early in 2011, we received a surprising invitation from the Financial Times Lexicon. A reader had 
suggested that an entry on differential accumulation be added to the Lexicon, and the online con-
tent developer asked us if we would be willing to write it.  
Our first thought was that this must have been a mistake. The FT speaks for capital. Like all 
mainstream financial media, its theoretical-ideological baseline is staunchly neoclassical (plus 
‘distortions’ to account for the disobedient facts). Occasionally, it allows the odd piece by a soft-
Keynesian, but that tends to be the far-left marker. Rarely if ever would you read in this newspa-
per a real critique of capitalism, let alone one that goes to the root (unless you include in this 
category Op-Ed pieces by Wall-Street-warriors-turned-social-activists and other converts special-
izing in the ‘social justice’ niche). All things considered, it wasn’t the natural outlet for our analy-
sis of dominant capital, modes of power and strategic sabotage. Not by a long shot. 
So how did we get invited? 
Simple. The content editor received a request for an entry on ‘differential accumulation’. 
Naturally, he didn’t know what the term meant, so he searched it on Google and found The 
Bichler & Nitzan Archives. At that point, he should have taken the time to read a bit. Had he done 
so, he would have realized that this was the wrong subject to pursue. But slaving for the FT, he 
had already seen it all. He knew all the tricks of self-promotion, all the ways of making banality 
look like novelty, all the paths to a reinvented wheel. There was nothing Bichler & Nitzan, who-
ever they were, could possibly teach him. So instead of reading, he passed the buck and asked us 
to write the entry. It wasn’t too much of a risk. If the piece ended up being a misfit, he could al-
ways flip-flop and refuse it. 
We knew all about such flip-flops. Over the years, we have received enough invitations-
turned-rejections to work out the template. The cycle typically comprises three stages. It begins 
with our receiving an enthusiastic, flattering letter asking us to make an original contribution. It 
continues with a steady stream of encouragements and inquiries about delivery time. And it ends 
with a prolonged silence, after the editor realizes he got more than he had bargained for: a piece 
too creative for its own good and clearly unfit for print.  
Still, the invitation was tempting. This was not some obscure academic journal, or a mar-
ginal newspaper. It was the Financial Times Lexicon. Posting a permanent entry there could help 
us present radical ideas to a very large conservative audience. And the time seemed right. As one 
FT writer put it, the ongoing crisis has robbed capitalists of their ‘intellectual compass’, and intel-
lectual confusion often opens the door for radical alternatives. Maybe this was our chance? 
We decided to test the water. We asked the content developer how long the article could be: 
‘as long as you wish’, he replied (virtual bytes cost nothing). We inquired whether we could in-
corporate figures and charts: ‘yes’, he said (visuals always sell well). We emphasized that our 
entry would offer a new approach: he had no objection whatsoever (tomorrow it will be flushed 
down with the rest of yesterday’s news). He did warn us, though, that the FT does not pay for 
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contributions: we never thought of asking for money (suckers). The whole exchange seemed 
amicable, and the content developer was encouraging, even enthusiastic. And besides, we had 
nothing to lose but our chains.  
We worked on the piece, and the content editor, fulfilling his role in the script, kept sending 
us encouraging queries. By the end of March, the piece was completed, and we delivered it safely 
to the FT. The editor replied promptly, promising to examine it ‘as soon as he can’. And then he 
fell silent. Ten days later, having heard nothing, we wrote to inquire. The editor apologized for 
not writing. He was ‘busy’ and would reply ‘as soon as he can’. Another two weeks passed, and 
we sent another email. It was a ‘busy time again’, we learnt, but the editor promised to look at 
the definition in the ‘next couple of weeks’. Those two weeks came and went, and when the si-
lence persisted, we sent another friendly query. This time, the reply was automatic: the editor 
was out of the office. We waited patiently for the standard two-week period and wrote again. 
The editor, forever polite, apologized. He needed more time – but not to worry, he would defi-
nitely get back to us ‘within the next two weeks’.  
We were getting ready for yet another two-week period, but then we noticed that there was a 
footnote to the email. The content editor must have realized we weren’t getting the message, so 
he decided to be a bit blunter: ‘Please note that some of our FT readers do not speak English as a 
first language, so definitions must be clear’. 
And then it dawned on us.  
The problem wasn’t our ideas. It was our words: they were simply too complicated. Power, 
sabotage, dominant capital, and differential accumulation – these are difficult words. They chal-
lenge one’s worldview. They rattle the mind. They can even make you think. And that, the con-
tent developer insinuated, is not what we need in our Lexicon.  
What we need are clear words. Conventional words. Words like ‘free competition’, ‘produc-
tive investment’, ‘profit maximization’, ‘deregulation’, ‘efficient markets’ and ‘sound finance’. 
Words that can help us standardize the FT readership. That is what we need. 
And so, we lost our chains and set our article free. You can read it below, with no FT strings 
attached.   
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The Article 
 
The concept of differential accumulation is part of a new approach to the study of capitalism. 
This approach, first developed by Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, emphasizes the pri-
macy of power rather than of consumption and production. The emphasis on power accentuates 
the centrality of relative rather than absolute measures and of disaggregate rather than aggregate 
methods. It focuses attention not on the quest for profit maximization by capital in general, but 
on the drive for differential accumulation by dominant capital in particular. 
 
The Conventional Dual View 
 
In the conventional view, epitomized by the neoclassical doctrine, capital belongs to the produc-
tive-material sphere of the ‘economy’. When free from outside ‘distortions’, the economy is an 
autonomous sphere, clearly demarcated from other spheres of society. It has its own laws, logic 
and purpose. Driven by the mechanical forces of supply and demand, energised by the quest for 
equilibrium, disciplined by competition and pushed forward by individualism, the ultimate 
achievement of the economy is utilitarian: it maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain.  
The principles of the economy negate hierarchy: they defuse all power relations through vol-
untary market clearing. Power certainly exists, but it exists mostly ‘outside’ the economy proper, 
primarily in the realm of politics and state. Governments never tire of imposing their power on 
the economy. They ‘intervene’ by using taxes and subsidies, regulation and discrimination, pub-
lic spending, tariffs and levies, among other strategies. But since the interventions are always 
‘exogenous’, coming from outside the economy, their outcomes are always sub-optimal, by defi-
nition.   
The Great Depression softened this fundamentalist division. After the 1930s, the strict sepa-
ration between economics and politics gave way to a synthetic compromise: government was 
given a positive ‘macroeconomic’ role, adjacent to the ‘microeconomic’ role of individual con-
sumers and firms. But the new synthesis didn’t change the meaning, position and logic of capital: 
it remained a productive-material entity, located in the economy and subject to its strict laws.  
The neoclassical doctrine sees capital as a dual entity. Capital is both productive capacity and 
market value, a ‘real’ thing whose material quantity is reflected in its ‘nominal’ price. On the face 
of it, modern capitalist decisions are driven by finance; but according to the dual view, in the 
final analysis finance is a derivative of production. From this perspective, the dollar market value of 
General Electric’s stocks and bonds mirrors the company’s overall productive capacity. When 
GE’s productive capacity increases – when it adds more factories, when it improves its plant and 
equipment, when it increases its knowhow – the real quantity of its capital grows, and that real 
growth causes a corresponding increase in the company’s dollar market value. And conversely – 
when the company neglects to boost its productive capacity, its real accumulation falters; and as 
real accumulation decelerates, the company’s dollar market value follows suit.  
This real-nominal correspondence is merely a first approximation: it holds only in the ideal 
world of perfectly competitive equilibrium. The actual world, though, even according to neoclas-
sicists, is rarely if ever in a perfectly competitive equilibrium. Unlike the models, reality is be-
sieged by disequilibrium, irrationality and distortions, and these imperfections cause the nominal 
magnitude to mismatch and deviate from the real one. 
This account, argue Bichler and Nitzan, is deeply problematic for at least two reasons. The 
first reason is theoretical. Capital, they say, is simply not a dual entity. Contrary to the conven-
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tional view, it has only one quantity: its nominal dollar value on the stock and bond markets. 
And that’s it. There is no underlying ‘real’ quantity to be examined, let alone measured. And 
without a real quantity, there is nothing for the dollar value of capital to match or mismatch.  
Economists might find this later claim nonsensical: after all, most countries provide detailed 
quantitative estimates of their ‘real capital stock’, so how could one say that these quantities do 
not exist? According to Bichler and Nitzan, though, these estimates, popular as they may be, do 
not – and indeed cannot – measure the real capital stock. In order to know the quantity of real 
capital, the statisticians have to sum up the quantities of individual ‘capital goods’ – plant, 
equipment, and infrastructure, as well as patented knowledge and goodwill, among other things. 
And this aggregate, say Bichler and Nitzan, is impossible to compute. According to neoclassical 
theory, the aggregate of capital goods, like every basket of commodities, is measured in terms of 
the utils it supposedly generates. But ‘utils’ are fictitious quanta that cannot be observed, let 
alone measured. 
So in practice, argue Bichler and Nitzan, the statisticians go in reverse: they use the dollar 
price of capital goods to ‘reveal’ their so-called productive quantity (i.e., their ability to generate 
utils). The first step in this process is to pick a point in time and claim it represents perfectly 
competitive equilibrium. The second step is to assume that, in a perfectly competitive equilib-
rium, the nominal dollar value reveals the real quantity of capital (so if the dollar price of a pat-
ent X is ten times bigger than that of machine Y, X must have ten times as much real capital as 
Y). The third step is to use these nominal values as weights with which to aggregate the different 
capital goods into real capital (multiplying the number of capital goods in each category by their 
dollar value and summing the results). And the fourth and final step is to announce that the 
nominal magnitude that emerges from this procedure is the quantity of real capital (read its util-
generating capacity). But since perfectly competitive equilibrium and the utils this equilibrium is 
said to ‘reveal’ are all fictitious entities, the resulting measure of real capital is devoid of any real 
meaning.  
The second problem of the real-nominal view is empirical. In practice, the oscillations of fi-
nance seem to have little to do with those of productive capacity – even when capacity is meas-
ured in nominal dollars (rather than in so-called real terms). To see the problem, note that, ac-
cording to the conventional creed, the deviations of finance from real capital, however large, 
tend to be pro-cyclical. In general, the market value of capital is expected to overshoot real accu-
mulation during a boom and undershoot it in a bust. In the first case, euphoria inflates a specula-
tive bubble; in the latter case, panic deflates it.  
But the evidence, at least in the United States, doesn’t sit well with this pro-cyclical conven-
tion. Figure 1 contrasts two growth series (based on nominal dollar data, since the ‘real’ meas-
ures are fictitious). The thick line shows the rate of growth of the productive capacity of U.S. 
corporations as measured by the current replacement cost of their fixed assets. The thin line 
shows the rate of growth of the dollar market value of U.S. corporate stocks and bonds. And here 
lies a puzzle: the growth of corporate market value, instead of moving in tandem with – and pos-
sibly amplifying – the growth of ‘real’ assets, appears to move in exactly the opposite direction. 
The figure shows a systematic, long-term counter-cyclical pattern in which the market value of 
corporations accelerates exactly when the dollar value of their ‘real’ capital decelerates, and vice 
versa.  
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Figure 1 
U.S. Capital Accumulation: Fiction vs. Reality 
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NOTE: The market value of equities and bonds is net of foreign holdings 
by U.S. residents. Series are shown as 10-year moving averages. The last 
data points are 2011 for the market value of corporate equities and bonds, 
and 2010 for the current cost of corporate fixed assets. 
    
SOURCE: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009) Capital as Power: 
A Study of Order and Creorder, p. 181. Updated till 2010-2011. Original data: 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight (series codes: 
FAPNREZ for current cost of corporate fixed assets). The market value of 
corporate equities & bonds splices series from the following two sources. 
1932-1951: Global Financial Data (market value of corporate stocks and 
market value of bonds on the NYSE). 1952-2011: Federal Reserve Board 
through Global Insight (series codes: FL893064105 for market value of cor-
porate equities; FL263164103 for market value of foreign equities held by 
U.S. residents; FL893163005 for market value of corporate and foreign 
bonds; FL263163003 for market value of foreign bonds held by U.S. resi-
dents). 
 
Now, since capitalist decisions are driven by finance, this inversion, say Bichler and Nitzan, 
means that theorists of accumulation have to make a hard choice: they can stick to the conven-
tional dual view and end up being unable to explain what drives capitalists, or they can go back 
to square one and develop a new framework altogether. 
 
Capitalization Reconsidered 
 
Bichler and Nitzan take the second route. Their starting point is the meaning of capitalism. In 
their framework, capitalism is not a mode of consumption and production, but a mode of power: a 
totalizing regime that defines, shapes and regulates the general trajectory of society.  
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The centre of this regime is the institution of capital. Earlier modes of power were organized 
through the complex codes of religion, kingship, feudal servitude and castes, among others. The 
capitalist mode of power replaces these complex codes with a universal logic: the power logic of 
capital. Now, in conventional theory, capital is a narrow economic entity that produces goods 
and services for its individual owners. But according to Bichler and Nitzan, this portrayal is 
deeply deceiving. Capital, they say, is not a productive entity but the key power institution that 
regulates capitalist society. Its language is not utilitarian, but financial. The ever-changing quanti-
ties of finance – expressed as capitalization – reflect not the capacity of capital goods to produce 
well-being, but the power of capitalist owners to constantly reshape the course of their society in 
their own interest. The logic of finance and capitalization is the anonymous, undifferentiated 
mechanism through which they control society. 
Capitalization represents the discounting to present value of risk-adjusted expected future earn-
ings, and each of its symbolic components – the expected future earnings, the risk that capitalists 
associate with these earnings, and the normal rate of return that they use to bring them to present 
value – is a manifestation of organized power.  
The primacy of power, say Bichler and Nitzan, is built into the concept of private ownership. 
The very concept implies exclusion and deprivation. In this sense, private ownership is a negative, 
not a positive, entity. It is based not on the ability to produce, but on the capacity to incapacitate. It 
is wholly and only an institution of exclusion, and institutional exclusion is a matter of organized 
power. Of course, exclusion does not have to be exercised. What matter here, argue Bichler and 
Nitzan, are the right to exclude and the ability to exact pecuniary terms for not exercising that right. 
This right and ability are the foundations of accumulation. They enable capitalists to profit greatly 
from mismanaging the world’s ecosystem, from making society more unequal and from blocking 
the development of humane alternatives – and to do all that under the guise of ‘scientific manage-
ment’ and the ‘efficient allocation’ of resources.   
Capital, Bichler and Nitzan claim, is nothing but organized power. This power, they say, has 
two sides: one qualitative, the other quantitative. The qualitative side comprises the many institu-
tions, developments and conflicts through which capitalists constantly creorder – or create the order 
of – their society; that is, the processes through which they shape and restrict the social trajectory in 
order to extract their tributary income. The quantitative side is the universal algorithm that inte-
grates, reduces and distils these numerous qualitative processes down to the monetary magnitude 
of capitalization.  
In principle, every stream of expected income is a candidate for capitalization. And since in-
come streams are generated by social entities, social processes, social organizations and social 
institutions, we end up with capitalization discounting not the so-called sphere of economics, but 
potentially every aspect of society. Human life, including its social habits and its genetic code, is 
routinely capitalized. Institutions – from education and entertainment to religion and the law – 
are habitually capitalized. Voluntary social networks, urban violence, civil war and international 
conflict are regularly capitalized. Even the environmental future of humanity is capitalized. 
Nothing escapes the eyes of the discounters. If it generates expected future income, it can be 
capitalized, and whatever can be capitalized sooner or later is capitalized.  
 
Business and Industry 
 
What is the object of capitalist power? How does it creorder society? According to Bichler and Nit-
zan, the answer begins with a conceptual distinction between two spheres: the first is the crea-
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tive/productive potential of society – or what American political economist Thorstein Veblen 
called ‘industry’; the second is the realm of power, which, in the capitalist epoch, takes the form of 
‘business’. Veblen conceived of industry as the collective knowledge and effort of humanity, a 
sphere that is inherently cooperative, integrated and synchronized. Business, in contrast, isn’t col-
lective; it is private. Its goals are achieved through the threat and exercise of systemic prevention 
and restriction – that is, through strategic sabotage. The key target of this sabotage is the resonating 
pulse of industry – a resonance that business constantly upsets through built-in dissonance.  
Bichler and Nitzan illustrate this interaction of business and industry conceptually and empiri-
cally. Conventional economics, they say, postulates a positive relationship between production and 
profit. Capitalists, the theory argues, benefit from industrial activity; and, therefore, the more fully 
employed their equipment and workers, the greater their profit. But if one thinks of capital as 
power, exercised through the strategic sabotage of industry by business, the relationship becomes 
nonlinear – positive under certain circumstances, negative under others. 
 
Figure 2 
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SOURCE: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009) Capital as Power: A 
Study of Order and Creorder, p. 237. 
 
This latter relationship is exemplified, hypothetically, in Figure 2. The chart depicts the utiliza-
tion of industrial capacity on the horizontal axis against the capitalist share of income on the verti-
cal axis. Now, up to a point, the two move together. After that point, the relationship becomes 
negative. The reason for this inversion can be explained by looking at extremes. If industry came to 
a complete standstill at the bottom left corner of the chart, capitalist earnings would be nil. But 
capitalist earnings would also be zero if industry always and everywhere operated at full socio-
technological capacity – depicted by the bottom right corner of the chart. Under this latter scenario, 
industrial considerations rather than business decisions would be paramount, production would no 
longer need the consent of owners, and these owners would then be unable to extract their tributary 
earnings. For owners of capital, then, the ideal Goldilocks condition, indicated by the top arc seg-
ment, lies somewhere in between: with high capitalist earnings being received in return for letting 
industry operate – though only at less than full potential.  
Figure 3 operationalizes this thought experiment for the United States since the 1930s. The 
horizontal axis approximates the degree of sabotage by using the official rate of unemployment, 
inverted (note that unemployment begins with zero on the right, indicating no sabotage, and that, 
as it increases to the left, so does sabotage). The vertical axis, as before, shows the share of national 
income received by capitalists.  
 
Figure 3 
Business and Industry in the United States 
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SOURCE: Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009) Capital as Power: 
A Study of Order and Creorder, p. 238. Updated till 2010. Original data: U.S. 
Department of Commerce through Global Insight (series codes: 
INTNETAMISC for interest; ZBECON for profit; YN for national in-
come; RUC for unemployment). 
 
And the empirical picture seems very close to the theoretical one. Like in Figure 2, the best po-
sition for capitalists is not when industry is fully employed, but when there is considerable unem-
ployment – in this case, around 7 per cent. In other words, the so-called ‘natural rate of unemploy-
ment’ and ‘business as usual’ are two sides of the same power process: a process in which business 
accumulates by strategically sabotaging industry. 
 
Differential Accumulation and Dominant Capital 
 
Now, power, argue Bichler and Nitzan, is never absolute; it’s always relative. For this reason, 
both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of capital accumulation have to be assessed differen-
tially, relative to other capitals. Contrary to the claims of conventional economics, say Bichler and 
Nitzan, capitalists are driven not to maximize profit, but to ‘beat the average’ and ‘exceed the nor-
mal rate of return’. Their entire existence is conditioned by the need to outperform, by the impera-
tive to achieve not absolute accumulation, but differential accumulation. And this differential drive is 
crucial: to beat the average means to accumulate faster than others; and since the relative magni-
tude of capital represents power, capitalists who accumulate differentially increase their power (to 
emphasize, for Bichler and Nitzan capitalist power relates not to the narrow neoclassical notion of 
‘market power’, but to the broad strategic capacity to inflict sabotage). 
The centrality of differential accumulation, claim Bichler and Nitzan, means that the analysis 
of accumulation should focus not only on capital in general, but also and perhaps more so on domi-
nant capital in particular – that is, on the leading corporate-state alliances whose differential accu-
mulation has gradually placed them at the centre of the political economy. 
Figure 4 plots the differential accumulation of dominant capital in the United States since 
1950. Dominant capital is approximated here using two slightly different measures: one is the larg-
est 100 firms in the Compustat universe (comprising firms listed in the United States); the other is 
the largest 100 U.S. firms in the Compustate universe (comprising firms that are both incorporated 
and listed in the United Sates). The constituents of each group are determined annually on the basis 
of market capitalization (the reason for using two different measures is that aggregate data for mar-
ket capitalization cover all listed firms regardless of their country of incorporation, whereas the ag-
gregate profit data of the national accounts pertain only to U.S.-incorporated firms). The chart 
shows two differential series – one for capitalization, based on the first definition of dominant capi-
tal, and another for net profit based on the second definition of dominant capital.  
Differential capitalization denotes the ratio between the average market value of dominant 
capital (U.S.-listed firms) and the average market value of all U.S.-listed firms. The series shows 
that, during the 1950s, a typical dominant capital corporation had 7.4 times the capitalization (read 
power) of the average listed company. By the 2000s, this ratio had risen to 35.5 – nearly a fivefold 
increase.  
This measure, though, significantly underestimates the power of dominant capital. Note that 
the vast majority of firms are not listed. Since the shares of unlisted firms are not publicly traded, 
they have no ‘market value’; the fact that they have no market value keeps them out of the statisti-
cal picture; and since most of the excluded firms are relatively small, differential measures based 
only on large listed firms end up understating the relative size of dominant capital.  
In order to get around this limitation, Bichler and Nitzan plot another differential measure – 
one that is based not on capitalization but on net profit – and that measure includes all U.S.-
incorporated firms, listed and unlisted. The computational steps are similar. They calculate the av-
erage net profit of a dominant-capital corporation (the total net profit of the top 100 Compustat 
companies incorporated and listed in the United Sates divided by 100); they then compute the av-
erage net profit of a U.S. corporation (total corporate profit after taxes divided by the number of tax 
returns of active corporations); finally, they divide the first result by the second.  
  
- 9 - 
Figure 4 
Differential Capitalization and Differential Net Profit 
in the United States 
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* Ratio between the average market capitalization of the top 100 
Compustat corporations listed in the United States (ranked annually by 
market capitalization) and the average market capitalization of all corpo-
rations listed in the United States. (The 1976-77 jump in differential capi-
talization is the result of adding the NASDAQ to the universe of listed 
companies [the NASDAQ started to operate in 1971, but data for total 
capitalization are available only from 1976 onward]. At the time of its in-
clusion, the NASDAQ listed very small firms, so its addition brought 
down the capitalization of the average corporations.) The last data points 
are for 2010. 
 
** Ratio between the average net profit of the top 100 Compustat corpora-
tions incorporated in the United States (ranked annually by market capi-
talization) and the average net profit of all U.S. active corporations (listed 
and unlisted). The number of U.S. active corporations for 2008–2010 is 
extrapolated based on recent growth rates. (The drop in the series during 
1992–93 is due primarily to the one-time SFAS 106 accounting charge, a 
regulation that required firms to report in advance the future cost of their 
post-employment benefits. Since the rule applied almost exclusively to 
large firms, it had a big effect on the numerator but a negligible one on the 
denominator.) 
 
SOURCE: Compustat funda file through WRDS (series codes: CSHO for 
common shares outstanding; PRCC_C for share price; NI for net income); 
Global Financial Data (number of listed corporations on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ till 1989); World Federation of Exchanges (num-
ber of listed corporations on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from 
1990); U.S. Internal Revenue Service (number of corporate tax returns for 
active corporations); U.S. Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds through 
Global Insight (FL893064105 for market value of corporate equities); U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight (ZA for profit after 
taxes). 
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As expected, the two series have very different orders of magnitude (notice the two log scales). 
But they are also highly correlated (which isn’t surprising, given that profit is the key driver of capi-
talization). This correlation, say Bichler and Nitzan, means that we can use the broadly based dif-
ferential profit indicator as a proxy for the power of dominant capital relative to all corporations. 
And the result is remarkable. The data show that during the 1950s, a typical dominant capital cor-
poration was 2,586 times larger/more powerful than the average U.S. firm. By the 2000s, this ratio 
had risen to 22,097 – nearly a ninefold increase. 
 
Capital as Power in Middle-East Energy Conflicts 
 
Bichler and Nitzan’s research offers various historical studies of differential accumulation in 
which they examine the quantities and qualities of capital as power. One of these is their work on 
the Middle East. Figure 5 shows the differential performance of the world’s six leading privately 
owned oil companies relative to the Fortune 500 benchmark. Each bar in the chart shows the ex-
tent to which the oil companies’ rate of return on equity exceeded or fell short of the Fortune 500 
average. The gray bars show positive differential accumulation – i.e. the per cent by which the oil 
companies exceeded the Fortune 500 average. The black bars show negative differential accumula-
tion; that is, the per cent by which the oil companies trailed the average. Finally, the little explosion 
signs in the chart show the occurrences of ‘Energy Conflicts’ – that is, regional energy-related wars.  
Now, conventional economics, say Bichler and Nitzan, has no interest in the differential 
profits of the oil companies, and it certainly has nothing to say about the relationship between 
these differential profits and regional wars. Differential profit is perhaps of some interest to fi-
nancial analysts, and Middle-East wars are the business of experts in international relations and 
security analysts. But since each of these phenomena belongs to a completely separate realm of 
society, no one has ever thought of relating them in the first place. And yet, these phenomena, 
argue Bichler and Nitzan, are not simply related. In fact, they could be thought of as two sides of 
the very same process – namely, the global accumulation of capital as power. They point to three 
remarkable relationships depicted in the chart.  
 
• First, every energy conflict was preceded by the large oil companies trailing the average. In 
other words, for an energy conflict to erupt, the oil companies first had to differentially de-
cumulate – a most unusual prerequisite from the viewpoint of any social science. 
 
• Second, every energy conflict was followed by the oil companies beating the average. In 
other words, war and conflict in the region, which social scientists customarily blame for 
‘distorting’ the aggregate economy, have served the differential interest of certain key firms 
at the expense of other key firms.  
 
• Third and finally, with one exception, in 1996-7, the oil companies never managed to beat 
the average without there first being an energy conflict in the region. In other words, the dif-
ferential performance of the oil companies depended not on production, but on the most ex-
treme form of sabotage: war.  
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* Return on equity is the ratio of net profit to owners’ equity. Differential return 
on equity is the difference between the return on equity of the Petro-Core and 
the Fortune 500, expressed as a per cent of the return on equity of the Fortune 
500. For 1992-3, data for Fortune 500 companies are reported without SFAS 106 
special charges. 
  
NOTE. The Petro-Core consists of British Petroleum (BP-Amoco since 1998), 
Chevron (with Texaco since 2001), Exxon (ExxonMobil since 1999), Mobil (till 
1998), Royal-Dutch/Shell and Texaco (till 2000). Company changes are due to 
mergers. The Energy Conflicts include: the 1967 Arab-Israel war, the 1973 Arab-
Israel war, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1979 first Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, the 
1982 second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1990-1 first Gulf War, the 2000 
second Palestinian Intifada, the 2001-2 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the 
launching of the ‘War on Terror’ and the 2002-3 second Gulf War. 
 
SOURCE: Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan (2010) ‘Capital as Power: 
Toward a New Cosmology of Capitalism’. Original data: Fortune; Standard & 
Poor’s Compustat. 
 
According to Bichler and Nitzan, these relationships, and the conclusions they give rise to, 
are nothing short of remarkable. First, the likelihood that all three patterns are the consequence 
of statistical fluke is negligible. In other words, there must be something very substantive behind 
the connection of Middle-East wars and global differential profits. 
Second, these relationships seamlessly fuse quality and quantity. In their research on the sub-
ject, Bichler and Nitzan show how the qualitative power aspects of international relations, su-
perpower confrontation, regional conflicts and the activity of the armament and oil companies, 
on the one hand, can both explain and be explained by the quantitative global process of capital 
accumulation, on the other.  
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Third, all three relationships have remained stable for half a century, allowing Bichler and 
Nitzan to predict, in writing and before the events, both the first and second Gulf Wars. This 
stability suggests that the patterns of capital as power – although subject to historical change 
from within society – are anything but haphazard. 
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